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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADINIsTRATIvE LAW-RAILWAY LABoR AcT-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-
[Federal].-The dispute arose under a collective agreement made between
the carrier, plaintiff, and two labor unions, which represented the employees,
defendants. The carrier rejected the claim of its employees that they were
entitled to do certain switchwork and declined to agree to a joint submis-
sion of the controversy to the National Railway Adjustment Board. But,
as permitted by the Act, the employees submitted the dispute, whereupon
the carrier appeared in the proceedings and made a defense on the merits.
The proceedings terminated with an award in favor of the employees.
Plaintiff now seeks by declaratory judgment both a new adjudication of its
rights under the original contact and a declaration that the Board's award
and order are void. Lack of due process is claimed in the failure of the
Act to provide for an appeal. Held: Whether or not identical with the
original controversy, this suit is essentially one to review the Board's award,
and, as such, it cannot be maintained, because the Act provides for an
exclusive remedy. Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswetl.'
In spite of the conspicuous amount of litigation passed upon by the
National Railway Adjustment Board, its awards have come before the
courts very rarely. 2 This is the first holding by a court of appeals that
the statutory enforcement procedure of the Board's awards is of an ex-
clusive character3 and that, therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to enter-
tain a suit for a declaratory judgment sought by a carrier which has been
unsuccessful before the Board. 4
The rules concerning the availability of declaratory judgments as a
method of securing judicial review of administrative determinations cannot
be identified properly with those concerning injunction. Declaratory relief
cannot be denied merely by application of the equitable doctrine that no
1. (App. D. C., 1941) 124 F. (2d) 235. One judge dissented.
2. Garrison, The National Railway Adjustment Board, a unique Agency
(1937) 46 Yale L. J. 566, at pp. 591-2: out of 1,616 awards handed down
by the Board up to July 30, 1936, only 1 had been challenged before the
courts.
3. On the ground that the statutory enforcement suit excludes any other
form of judicial review of the Board's awards, injunction has been denied
to third parties: R. R. Yardmasters of N. A., Inc. v. Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R. R. Co. (D. C., N. D. Ohio, E. D. 1940) 39 F. Supp. 876. Contra,
Nord v. Griffin (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 481, cert. den. (1937) 300
U. S. 673; Brand v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (D. C., E. D. Pa., 1938) 22
F. Supp. 569 (injunctive relief granted to third parties not notified in the
Board's proceedings); Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R. Co. (1937)
180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509 (award disregarded as a nullity, because the
Board lacked jurisdiction over the parties).
4. The court further states that, even if it had jurisdiction, it would deny
the declaratory relief as a matter of discretion. That this is the holding
of the decision is affirmed in Note (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 666, at p. 668.
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injunction lies when the statutory remedy is still open.5 Although there
is some broad language in the cases which would support the assimilation
of declaratory judgments and injunctions, so far as their pre-requisites are
concerned, these cases are based on a statute which expressly declares the
statutory remedy provided for to be exclusive. 7 It is, therefore, proper to
limit their authority to the particular situation involved.8
The very purpose of the declaratory judgment is supplemental,9 and only
when the existing statutory method of review is exclusive are the courts
deprived of jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.' 0 When the statutory
proceeding is not expressly declared to be exclusive, the availability of the
declaratory judgment becomes a problem of statutory construction."1 This
issue is the main one involved in the principal case. It was urged in the
dissent that the enforcement procedure provided for in the Railway Labor
Act is not exclusive of the declaratory relief for the carrier, because the
contrary construction of the statute would raise serious doubts as to its
constitutionality and therefore must be avoided if possible.'2 But this argu-
ment is not in line with the authorities. Enforcement suits satisfy the re-
quirements of due process,' s for until the action is brought the defendant
cannot "suffer.""* Provisions similar to those making the Board's award
5. As to injunction, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1938) 303
U. S. 41. Where the statutory remedy has been denied, jurisdiction to issue
an injunction has been recognized in Utah Fuel Co. v. N. B. C. C. (1939)
806 U. S. 56 (injunction denied on the merits). This decision was criticised
by McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Administrative Orders (1940)
Cal. L. Rev. 129, 159-162. Curiously enough this decision is cited by the
dissenting judge in the principal case as though it would support the ex-
clusive statutory remedy.
6. Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F. (2d)
97, cert. den. (1936) 299 U. S. 559; Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v.
Schauffler (1938) 303 U. S. 54. On the authority of these cases, McAllister,
Statutory Roads to Review of Administrative Orders (1940) Cal. L. Rev.
129, states, at p. 167, that the declaratory judgment "has been unavailing
in the face of a statutory review procedure."
7. National Labor Relations Act (1935) 49 Stat. 455, 29 U. S. C. A.
§160 (e).
8. Moreover no allegation of irreparable injury is required as a pre-
requisite for the exercise of declaratory jurisdiction: Nashville, C. & St.
L. R. Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 264.
9. §274 (d) of the Judicial Code, as amended 28 U. S. C. A. §400; Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 57: "The existence of another adequate remedy
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is
appropriate."
10. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 342; cf. Gellhorn,
Administrative Law-Cases and Comments (1940) 799.
11. Borchard, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 65.
12. Wasnington Terminal Co. v. Boswell (App. D. C. 1941) 124 F. (2d)
285, 276.
13. Dalton Machine Co. v. Virginia (1915) 236 U. S. 699, 701; Thomas
v. Dennis (D. C. W. D. Wash. N. D. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 501, 502; Mc-
Dermott v. Bradford (D. C. W. D. Wash. S. D. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 661,
664 (injunction denied). But see Hill v. Wallace (1922) 259 U. S. 44.
14. F. T. C. v. Claire Furnace Co. (1926) 274 U. S. 160, 174; F. T. C.
v. Maynard Coal Co. (1927) 22 F. (2d) 873.
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prima facie evidence15 have been declared to establish a mere presumption
and not to abridge the right of trial by jury.'(
The court's interpretation of the Congressional intent to make the en-
forcement proceeding exclusive rests on the following factors: (a) provi-
sion for a detailed plan of review; (b) the "unusual and highly important
advantages" given by it to the employees; and (c) the need to avoid the
"race of diligence" to the courts between employees suing to enforce the
Board's award and the carrier seeking a declaratory judgment of its rights.1"
The court also refers to the rule of "primary jurisdiction" as lending sup-
port to its conclusion.18
But these arguments have been greatly weakened by the decision in
Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,19 handed down by the Supreme
Court after the principal case had been argued. The decision there held
that the Railway Labor Act did not "take away from the Courts the juris-
diction to determine a controversy over a wrongful discharge or to make
an administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a suit in it."20 The car-
rier which knows of the availability of independent judicial proceedings
will probably race to the courts for a declaratory adjudication of its con-
tractual rights,2 ' in order to deprive the employee of whatever advantages
the Board's procedure and the subsequent enforcement suit had provided
for him. The "primary jurisdiction" rule,22 if it can be invoked properly
at all in the present situation, is certainly deprived of its main purpose,
because a wholly judicial procedure is alternative to the administrative
process.
15. Railway Labor Act (1934) 48 Stat. 1185, 45 App. U. S. C. A. §153,
First, (p).
16. Cf. Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) 38 Stat. 722, 15 U. S. C. A.
§§49, 50; Packers' and Stockyards Act (1921) 42 Stat. 168, 7 U. S. C. A.
§222, and Interstate Commerce Act (1906) 34 Stat. 590, as amended by
(1910) 36 Stat. 554 and (1920) 41 Stat. 491, 49 U. S. C. A. §16 (1, 2). See
under the Interstate Commerce Act, Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1915)
236 U. S. 412; Montrose Oil Refining Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R.
Co. (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1927) 25 F. (2d) 750, 754, aff'd (C. C. A. 5, 1928)
25 F. (2d) 755, cert. den. (1928) 277 U. S. 598. See under the Railway
Labor Act, Cook v. Des Moines Union M. R. Co. (D. C. S. D. Iowa, C. D.
1936) 16 F. Supp. 810. But see Note (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 666, 671: "By
analogy to arbitration law, it may be argued that parties voluntarily in-
voking the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board waive their right tojudicial review of the merits of awards."
17. Washington Terminal v. Boswell (App. D. C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 235,
240-242.
18. Id. at 251.
19. (1941) 312 U. S. 630.
20. Id. at 634.
21. See Adams v. N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1941)
121 F. (2d) 808.
22. This term is here used in a broad sense because it usually indi-
cates an administrative stage which must proceed judicial action. See Note
(1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251; McAllister, supra note 5, and Berger, Ex-
haustion of administrative remedies (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 981, at 995,
who identifies, for practical purposes, the rules of primary jurisdiction and
of the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
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These considerations make the first ground of the decision-that the
enforcement suit is exclusive and that therefore the court lacks juris-
diction to entertain a suit for declaratory relief-somewhat problematic.
Yet the factors relied upon by the court seem to be a proper basis for
denying declaratory judgment in the discretion reserved to the courts by
the Declaratory Judgment Act, which represents the second ground of the
present decision.
P. B. R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGET OF COUNSEL-RIGHT TO EFFEcTmVE CouN-
su,-[United States].-The petitioner, an assistant United States Attorney,
was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to defraud the government. At the
beginning of the trial, the court suggested that the petitioner's attorney
represent a co-defendant, Kretske, whose attorney had withdrawn from
the case. When petitioner objected, the court withdrew its suggestion. How-
ever, petitioner's attorney, after consulting with Kretske, suggested that
he be appointed to represent the latter. The trial court thereupon appointed
him attorney for Kretske. Petitioner did not object during the trial which
lasted a month. Fifteen weeks after the trial had ended, he appealed on
the ground that the court's action without his approval had denied him
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The appeal was
denied and the petitioner brought writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Held: sharing of counsel without express consent violated the Sixth Amend-
ment. Gl sser v. United States.,
The importance of the right to counsel as shown by the historical devel-
opment in the English common law and in American colonial history2 in-
sured its inclusion as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.8
1. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 405. (Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
Chief Justice Stone dissenting.)
2. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, 61, the majority opinion
contains an interesting discussion of the development of the right to counsel
in the American colonies, and cites the following authorities: Zephaniah
Swift, A System of the Law of Connecticut, (1795-1796) Vol. II, Bk. 5, "Of
Grimes and Punishments," c. XXIV, "Of Trials," 398-399; Del. Const.
(1776) Art 16, Ga. Const. (1798) Art. 3, §8, Md. Const. (1776) Art. 19,
Mass. Const. (1780) Part I, Art. 12, N. H. Const. (1784) Part I, Art. 15,
N. Y. Const. (1777) Art. 34, Pa. Const. (1776) Art. 9; North Carolina,
Session Laws 1777, c. 115, §85 (North Carolina Rev. Laws, 1715-1796, Vol.
1, 316), South Carolina, Act of August 20, 1731, §XLIII Grinike, South
Carolina Public Laws, (1682-1790), 130 (right to counsel assured in capital
offenses), Va., Chap. VII §III, Laws Of Va., 8th Geo. II, 4 Hening, Stat.
at L., 404 (petitioner in capital offenses allowed counsel on his petition to
court), "An Act Declaratory of Certain Rights of the People of the State" s.
6 Rev. Pub. Laws, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, (1798).
3. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, the Supreme Court seem-
ingly placed the right to counsel, as it might arise in state cases, within
the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
action was in accord with the practice of placing the "fundamental" rights
contained in the first eight Amendments to the Constitution within the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Betts v. Brady (June 1, 1942)
1942]
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